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Abstract
Generating adversarial examples for natural language is hard, as natural language consists of
discrete symbols, and examples are often of variable lengths. In this paper, we propose a geometry-
inspired attack for generating natural language adversarial examples. Our attack generates
adversarial examples by iteratively approximating the decision boundary of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs). Experiments on two datasets with two different models show that our attack fools natural
language models with high success rates, while only replacing a few words. Human evaluation
shows that adversarial examples generated by our attack are hard for humans to recognize. Further
experiments show that adversarial training can improve model robustness against our attack.
1 Introduction
Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been successful in many machine learning applica-
tions (Kim, 2014; Rajpurkar et al., 2016; He et al., 2016), researchers have demonstrated that DNNs
are remarkably vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which generate adversarial examples by adding small
perturbations to the original input (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Nguyen et al., 2015).
Adversarial examples are essential as they showcase the limitations of DNN models. Like humans, good
DNN models should be robust to small perturbations to inputs. If a DNN model judges two almost
identical inputs differently, one must profoundly question the quality of the DNN. As such adversarial
examples are more than just a gimmick: they are a proof of the fundamental limitations of a DNN model.
Previous research on adversarial attacks has been largely focused on images, e.g., (Akhtar and Mian,
2018). In this paper, we study how to adversarially attack natural language models. Generating adversarial
examples for natural language is fundamentally different from generating adversarial examples for images.
Images live in a continuous universe, where one can simply change pixel values. Natural language
sentences and words on the other hand are typically discrete. This discrete nature makes it difficult to
apply existing attacks from the image domain directly to natural language, as an arbitrary point in the
input space is unlikely to correspond to a valid natural language sentence or word. Moreover, inputs
of natural language to DNNs are of variable lengths, which further complicates generating adversarial
examples for natural language.
Despite these obstacles, researchers have proposed various attacks to generate adversarial examples
for natural language. Jia and Liang (2017) manage to fool a DNN model for machine reading by adding
sentences to the original texts. Zhao et al. (2018) generate adversarial examples for natural language
by using an autoencoder. Ebrahimi et al. (2018) propose a gradient-based attack to generate adversarial
examples in the granularity of individual characters. Zhang et al. (2019) generate fluent adversarial
examples using Metropolis-Hastings sampling. Ren et al. (2019) combine several heuristics to generate
adversarial examples.
However, all these methods do not address the “geometry” of DNNs, which has been shown to be a
useful approach in the image domain (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019;
Modas et al., 2019). In this paper, we propose a geometry-inspired attack1 for generating natural language
adversarial examples. Our attack generates adversarial examples by iteratively approximating the decision
1Code: https://github.com/zhaopku/nlp_geometry_attack
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boundary of DNNs. We conduct experiments with Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) on two text classification tasks: the IMDB movie review dataset, and AG’s
News dataset. Experimental results show that our attack fools the models with high success rates while
keeping the word replacement rates low. We also conduct a human evaluation, showing that adversarial
examples generated by our attack are hard for humans to recognize. Further experiments show that model
robustness against our attack can be achieved by adversarial training.
2 Related Work
Despite the success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in many machine learning applications (Kim,
2014; He et al., 2016), researchers have revealed that such models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
which fool DNN models by adding small perturbations to the original input (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
The vulnerability of DNN models poses threats to many applications requiring high-level security. For
example, in the image domain, a small error in a self-driving car could lead to life threatening disaster. For
natural language, a machine might misunderstand a meaning, coming to a wrong conclusion. Researchers
have also shown that a universal trigger could lead a system to generate highly offensive language (Wallace
et al., 2019).
Previously, researchers have developed various adversarial attacks for fooling DNN models for images.
Goodfellow et al. (2015) propose Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM), which aims to maximize the
loss of the model with respect to the correct label. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018)
can be viewed as a multi-step version of FGSM. In each step, PGD generates a perturbation using FGSM,
and then projects the perturbed input to an l∞ ball. While these gradient-based methods are effective,
researchers also show that leveraging geometry information of DNNs can be helpful. Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. (2016) and Modas et al. (2019) generate adversarial examples by iteratively approximating the decision
boundary of DNNs.
Although many methods have been proposed for generating adversarial examples for images, little
attention has been paid to generating adversarial examples for natural language. Generating adversarial
examples for natural language is fundamentally different from generating adversarial examples for images.
On the one hand, while pixel values of images are continuous, natural language consists of sequences of
discrete symbols. Moreover, natural language sentences and words are often of variable lengths. Hence,
existing adversarial attacks designed for images cannot be directly applied to natural language.
Despite obstacles, researchers have proposed various methods for generating adversarial examples for
natural language. Based on the granularity of adversarial perturbations, adversarial attacks for natural
language models can be divided into three categories: character level, word level and sentence level.
2.1 Character Level
Character-level adversarial attacks for natural language models generate adversarial examples by modify-
ing individual characters of the original example. Ebrahimi et al. (2018) propose HotFlip, which uses
gradient information to swap, insert, or delete a character in an original example. Li et al. (2019) generate
adversarial examples by first selecting important words, and then modifying characters of the selected
words.
Although character-level adversarial attacks for natural language are effective, such methods suffer
from the problem of perceptibility. Humans are likely to recognize adversarial examples generated by
these methods, as changing individual characters of texts often results in invalid words. Furthermore,
character-level adversarial attacks are easy to be defended against. Using a simple spell checking tool to
preprocess inputs can defend a DNN model against such attacks.
2.2 Word Level
Word-level adversarial attacks generate adversarial examples for natural language by changing words
of the original example. Alzantot et al. (2018) propose a genetic attack, in which they replace original
words with their synonyms by iteratively applying a genetic algorithm. Zhang et al. (2019) generate
adversarial examples for natural language by leveraging Metropolis-Hastings Sampling. Ren et al. (2019)
leverage several heuristics to generate word-level adversarial examples. Wallace et al. (2019) propose
a universal attack, in which a fixed, input-agnostic sequence of words triggering the model to make a
specific prediction is prepended to any example from the dataset. They search such universal triggers by
leveraging gradient information.
2.3 Sentence Level
While most researchers focus on character/word-level attacks, some researchers propose to fool DNN
models for natural language with sentence-level attacks. Jia and Liang (2017) propose to fool a machine
reading model by adding an additional sentence to the original texts. However, their method requires heavy
human engineering. Iyyer et al. (2018) generate adversarial examples by rewriting the entire sentence
with an encoder-decoder model for syntactically controlled paraphrase generation.
All these methods, however, do not address the geometry of DNNs although such information has
been proven useful for generating adversarial examples for images. In this paper, we propose a geometry-
inspired word-level adversarial attack for generating natural language adversarial examples. The rest
of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our attack. Section 4 details the experimental
settings as well as results. Section 5 gives conclusions and insights for future work.
3 Methodology
Our attack is a white-box attack in that the attacker has access to the architecture and parameters of the
victim model. The attack crafts natural language adversarial examples by replacing original words with
their synonyms. Specifically, our attack can be divided into two steps: word selection and synonym
replacement. In each iteration, the attack first selects a word from the original text, and then replaces the
selected word with one of its synonyms to craft an adversarial example. The remainder of this section
gives the details of our attack.
3.1 Word Selection Strategy
A crucial step in generating text adversarial examples is to find which word of the original example to
replace. We follow previous work by ranking words with their saliency scores (Li et al., 2016a; Li et al.,
2016b; Ren et al., 2019). The saliency score of word wj is obtained by computing the decrease of true
class probability after replacing wj with an out-of-vocabulary word u, embeddings of which are initialized
to all zeros during training.
Specifically, we have
X = w0, w1, . . . , wj , . . . , wN−1 (1)
X ′ = w0, w1, . . . , u, . . . , wN−1 (2)
where X ′ is obtained by replacing word wj of the original example X with out-of-vocabulary word u.
Let y be the ground truth label of original example X . The saliency score Sj for word wj is given by
Sj = P (y|X)− P (y|X ′) (3)
A higher saliency score indicates the corresponding word is of more importance for predicting the true
class. Hence, the word with the highest saliency score in candidate set C will be selected for replacement.
We build the candidate set C from words of the original example X and then exclude all out-of-vocabulary
words and punctuations.
3.2 Synonym Replacement Strategy
Before going into the details of our synonym replacement strategy, we first clarify our assumptions on
model architectures. For text classification tasks, a model can be divided into a text encoder Encoder
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attack
1: input: Example X = w0, w1, . . . , wN−1, true label y, classifier f with text encoder Encoder and
feed forward layer FFNN.
2: output: Adversarial example Xˆ .
3: Initialize X0 ←X , candidate set C = {w0, w1, . . . , wK−1}, i← 0, projections P← {}, i← 0.
4: while C 6= ∅ do
5: for wk ∈ C do
6: Sk ←WordSaliency(Xi, wk) // compute word saliency
7: end for
8: k∗ ← argmaxk Sk, where wk ∈ C
9: Q∗k ← {w0k∗ , w1k∗ , . . . , wMj−1k∗ } // synonym set of wk∗
10: vi ← Encoder(Xi)
11: bi ← DeepFool(vi,FFNN)
12: ri ← bi − vi
13: ui ← ri||ri||
14: for m = 0 to Mj − 1 do
15: Craft Xmi by replacing wk∗ with w
m
k∗
16: vmi ← Encoder(Xmi )
17: dmi ← vmi − vi
18: pmi ← Projection(dmi , ri)
19: P← P ∪ {pmi }
20: end for
21: m∗ ← argmaxm(pmi · ui), where pmi ∈ P
22: Xi+1 ←Xm∗i
23: if f(Xi+1) 6= f(X) then
24: Xˆ ←Xi+1
25: break
26: end if
27: C← C− {wk∗}
28: i← i+ 1
29: end while
30: return Xˆ
and a feed forward layer FFNN. Specifically, a text encoder encodes an input X into a fixed-size vector v.
Choices of such encoders include RNNs, CNNs (Kim, 2014), etc. A feed forward layer then takes the
fixed-size vector v as input for classification. A fully connected network followed by a softmax activation
layer is common for feed forward layers.
Our attack iterates over the candidate set C to generate adversarial examples. In each iteration, we
first compute word saliency score Sk for each candidate word wk ∈ C. We derive the synonym set
Qk∗ = {w0k∗ , w1k∗ , . . . , wMj−1k∗ } using WordNet2 for candidate word wk∗ , which has the largest saliency
score Sk∗ in the current iteration.
We then use geometric information to select the best synonym of wk∗ for replacement. Given a DNN
classifier consisting of text encoder Encoder and feed forward layer FFNN, we first use Encoder to
compute the text vector vi of Xi, which is the example before replacement at iteration i. We then find the
nearest point bi on the decision boundary of FFNN by leveraging the DeepFool algorithm (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016). Next, we compute ri, which originates from text vector vi to decision boundary
point bi.
For each synonym wmk∗ ∈ Qk∗ , example Xmi is obtained by replacing wk∗ with wmk∗ . We compute
text vector vmi by feeding X
m
i into the Encoder. We obtain p
m
i by projecting d
m
i , which is the vector
2https://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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Figure 1: Illustration of iteration i in our attack: vi is the original text vector. The curved line on top
is the decision boundary, with bi being the closest point on the decision boundary to vi. v0i and v
1
i are
text vectors obtained by replacing word wk∗ with its synonyms w0k∗ and w
1
k∗ , respectively. p
0
i (p
1
i ) is the
projection of d0i (d
1
i ) onto ri. In this iteration, w
0
k∗ is chosen over w
1
k∗ as ||p0i || > ||p1i ||. We also have
zmaxi = ||p0i || in this example.
originating from vi to vmi , onto ri. A new example Xi+1 is crafted by replacing original word wk∗ with
its synonym wm∗k∗ , which corresponds to the largest projection z
max
i , where z
max
i = p
m∗
i · ui, with ui
being the unit direction vector of ri. Our intuition is that a text vector with larger projection on ri is closer
to the decision boundary. We assign Xi to Xi+1 directly and continue to the next iteration if zmaxi is
negative (which indicates pm
∗
i is in the opposite direction of ui and ri). Figure 1 illustrates our synonym
replacement strategy. The algorithm stops under the condition that the model is fooled or the candidate set
C is exhausted. We give details of our attack in Algorithm 1.
4 Experimental Results
We elaborate our experiments in this section. Section 4.1 details the experimental settings. Section 4.2
describes the results of adversarial attacks. We conduct a human evaluation in Section 4.3 to understand
the perceptibility of our adversarial perturbations. Section 4.4 gives the results of adversarial training,
which we found can improve the robustness of DNN models against our attack.
4.1 Setup
We describe our experimental setup, including datasets and models in this subsection. We test our attack
on two datasets with two different models.
Datasets We conduct our experiments on two English datasets for text classification. Specifically, we
have
• IMDB3 (Maas et al., 2011): The IMDB dataset is a large dataset for binary sentiment classification.
Each example in the dataset is a movie review. The classification label is positive/negative.
Both labels are equally distributed in the dataset.
• AG’s News4: The AG’s News dataset consists of news articles for topic classification. The dataset
has four equally distributed labels: World, Sports, Business and Sci/Tech.
We list the details of the datasets in table 2. Note that in preprocessing, we limit the maximum number
of words to 600 for each example in the IMDB dataset. We do not limit the maximum number of words
in the AG’s News dataset. Additionally, examples in both datasets are tokenized using NLTK5. The
average/maximum number of words is computed after preprocessing.
3https://ai.stanford.edu/˜amaas/data/sentiment/
4http://groups.di.unipi.it/˜gulli/AG_corpus_of_news_articles.html
5https://www.nltk.org/
Example Predictions Replacements Distance True Class Prob
Obviously, most of the budget was put into the
dinosaurs, and although there is a fair share of
them, there’s not nearly enough to save (pre-
serve) us from our boredom (ennui). These
human characters are only there to scream, run
around, and mutter these poorly-written and
verbose speeches about survival. And unfor-
tunately (regrettably), not nearly enough of
them get eaten by the dinosaurs. Overall ,
“planet of the dinosaurs” is not a film I plan
on seeing again.
Negative→ Positive
boredom→ ennui
save→ preserve
unfortunately→ regrettably
0.80→ 0.56
0.56→ 0.25
0.25→ -0.14
84.19%→ 76.55%
76.55%→ 62.62%
62.62%→ 42.93%
Screening as part of a series of funny shorts
at the sydney gay and lesbian mardi gras film
festival, this film was definitely (unquestion-
ably) a highlight. The script is great (smash-
ing) and the direction and acting was terrific.
As another posting said, the actors’ comedic
timing really made this film. Lots of fun.
Positive→ Negative great→ smashingdefinitely→ unquestionably
1.56→ 0.01
0.01→ -0.79
96.37%→ 50.12%
50.12%→ 15.88%
This is the first movie I have watched in ages
where I actually ended up fast forwarding
through the tedious (wordy) bits which there
are plenty of. Very ordinary movie. I’m glad
I missed it at the movies & got a 2 for 1 video
deal which included this movie instead.
Negative→ Positive tedious→ wordy 2.45→ -1.89 99.42%→ 40.21%
Ready (Prepare) to bet (depend) on alterna-
tive energy? Well, think again when oil prices
rise, public interest in alternative energy often
does, too. But the logic is evidently escaping
wall street.
Business→ Sci/Tech bet→ dependready→ prepare
2.65→ 0.34
0.34→ -2.19
99.65%→ 68.03%
68.03%→ 0.51%
Convicted spammer gets nine years in slam-
mer (jailhouse) A brother and sister have
been convicted of three felony charges of send-
ing thousands of junk e-mails; one of them
was sentenced to nine years in prison, the other
was fined $ 7,500.
Sci/Tech→ Business slammer→ jailhouse 2.64→ -0.98 99.77%→ 8.67%
Osaka school killer (slayer) of 8, Yakuza boss
executed Yokyo - Mamoru Takuma, convicted
for murdering eight children at an Osaka el-
ementary school in 2001, has been executed,
informed sources said Tuesday.
World→ Sports killer→ slayer 1.59→ -1.60 98.20%→ 1.60%
Table 1: Adversarial examples from our attack. Irrelevant parts of an example are omitted for simplicity.
The first three examples are from the IMDB dataset, and the last three are from AG’s News dataset. We
use LSTM-based RNN for both datasets. Green words are original words, while red words are replaced
words. Predictions: model predictions before and after the attack. Replacements: word replacements.
Distance: changes of distance from text vector to decision boundary. True Class Prob: changes of true
class probability as original words being replaced. “True Class” refers to the true class of the original
example.
Dataset #Train #Test #Classes Avg. #Words Max. #Words
IMDB 25,000 25,000 2 258 600
AG’s News 120,000 7,600 4 43 248
Table 2: Statistics of datasets. Note that we limit the maximum number of words per example for the
IMDB dataset to 600, while we do not limit the maximum number of words for the AG’s News dataset.
Dataset
Model CNN RNN
IMDB 88.49 85.69
AG’s News 92.18 91.17
Table 3: Test accuracy (%) of our model on clean examples.
Method
IMDB AG’s News
CNN RNN CNN RNN
% Replaced↓ % Success↑ % Replaced↓ % Success↑ % Replaced↓ % Success↑ % Replaced↓ % Success↑
Ren et al. (2019) 3.59 88.95 3.79 84.09 10.01 85.95 15.33 79.90
Our Attack 3.19 96.12 2.97 99.09 16.33 86.49 14.91 87.08
Table 4: Results of adversarial attacks. Replaced: Average word replacement rate. Success: Success rate
of attack. Larger↑ (or lower↓) numbers indicate the attack is more efficient.
Models We consider two different DNN models to test the effectiveness of our attack. Specifically, we use
word-based convolutional neural networks (CNN) and recurrent neural networks (RNN). We use LSTM
as the recurrent unit in RNN. A CNN or RNN is a text encoder, which takes as input texts X and outputs
a fixed-size vector v. A fully connected layer with softmax activation is followed for classification. For
both models, we use 100-dimensional GloVe embeddings6 (Pennington et al., 2014) in our experiments.
All hidden layers are 128-dimensional. Table 3 gives the performance of our model on clean examples.
These results are comparable to model performance in other studies (Alzantot et al., 2018; Ren et al.,
2019), which means that our implementation is fair and that we are ready to investigate performance of
our adversarial attacks on these models.
4.2 Adversarial Attacks
We limit the maximum number of word replacements to 50 and 25 for the IMDB dataset and AG’s News
dataset, respectively. In other words, the algorithm gives up if it still cannot find an adversarial example
after the number of words replaced in the original example has exceeded the limit. We report the success
rate of our attack on all correctly classified examples from the testset to prevent the model performance
on clean examples from confounding the attack results. We also report the average word replacement rate
for our adversarial examples. A lower word replacement rate makes it harder for humans to distinguish
adversarial examples from the original ones.
We compare our attack with the state-of-the-art attack Probability Weighted Word Saliency
(PWWS) (Ren et al., 2019), which uses a greedy algorithm based on heuristics like word saliency
and true class probability. For a fair comparison, the max length of examples is set to 600 for the
IMDB dataset. We do not limit the maximum number of words for the AG’s News dataset. While we
obtain the results of PWWS for each dataset by evaluating on 1,000 randomly selected original examples
from the testset, we evaluate our attack on the entire testset. The execution inefficiency of the original
implementation from (Ren et al., 2019) makes it unrealistic to evaluate PWWS on the entire testset.
Table 4 shows the results of our adversarial attacks. As we can see, our attack outperforms PWWS
in most of the metrics. For the IMDB dataset, our attack fools the CNN and RNN model with success
rates of 96.12% and 99.09%, respectively. Our success rates are higher than the success rates of PWWS
(88.95% for CNN, 84.09% for RNN). While reaching higher success rates, our method also has lower
word replacement rates than PWWS. The average word replacement rate is 3.19% for CNN model and
6https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
Dataset % Accuracy Similarity ModifiedOriginal Adversarial Original Adversarial Original Adversarial
IMDB 92 90 4.13 3.40 2.59 3.14
AG’s News 90 81 4.96 3.29 2.18 3.16
Table 5: Human evaluation. Accuracy: prediction accuracy of human on the examples. Similarity: Given
a score of 1-5, judge the similarity of the example text to the original text. Modified: Given a score of
1-5, judge the possibility of the example text having been modified by a machine. Higher score indicates
higher similarity/possibility.
2.97% for RNN model, both of which are lower than results from PWWS (3.59% for CNN, 3.79% for
RNN).
For AG’s News dataset, the success rate of our method is 86.49% for CNN and 87.08% for RNN. The
average word replacement rate is 16.33% for CNN and 14.91% for RNN. Our method still outperforms
PWWS in the RNN model, where the success rate and average word replacement rate of PWWS are
79.90% and 15.33%, respectively. However, in the CNN model, while having a similar success rate, our
model has a higher word replacement rate of 16.33% compared to 10.01% of PWWS.
Compared to attack results of the IMDB dataset, we obtain lower success rates and higher word
replacement rates for AG’s News dataset. Possible explanations are: (1) fooling a multi-class classifier
is harder than fooling a binary classifier, (2) examples of the IMDB dataset are longer than examples of
AG’s News dataset, and it is easier to generate adversarial examples for longer sequences.
Table 1 gives some adversarial examples generated by our attack. As the attack replaces words from
the original example, the true class probability decreases and the resulting text vector moves closer to
the decision boundary. A distance smaller than 0 indicates that the text vector has crossed the decision
boundary.
4.3 Human Evaluation
We conducted a human evaluation to understand the perceptibility of our adversarial perturbations. For
each dataset, we randomly select 100 adversarial examples and the corresponding original examples.
We hired workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk7 to conduct the evaluation. We asked the workers to
perform three tasks:
(1) Accuracy: Predict the label of an example.
(2) Similarity: Judge the similarity of the given example to the original example.
(3) Modified: Judge the possibility that some words in the texts having been replaced by a machine.
For the last two tasks, the workers are required to give a score between 1 to 5. A higher score
indicates more similarity/higher possibility. For each task, each assignment is shown to five workers. All
assignments are randomly shuffled before shown to workers. For task (1), we take the majority of the five
predictions as our final label. Note that for the AG’s News dataset, we count an example as incorrectly
classified if no majority label exists. For tasks (2) and (3), we average scores across workers.
Table 5 shows the results of our human evaluation. For the IMDB dataset, the prediction accuracy on
adversarial examples is only 2% lower than the accuracy on original examples. This shows that adversarial
examples generated by our attack mostly preserve the content and sentiment of the original examples. The
evaluation on similarity and possibility of modifications also shows that the perceived difference between
our adversarial examples and the original examples is relatively small. Note that the perturbations are
more perceptible on AG’s News dataset, which is expected as the average word replacement rate of AG’s
News dataset is higher than that of the IMDB dataset.
To better understand human performance in judging similarity of texts, the workers were also asked in
task (2) to give the similarity score between two identical original examples (refer to column 4 of Table 5).
7https://www.mturk.com/
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Figure 2: Results of adversarial training. The x-axis is epoch. Epoch 0 corresponds to models trained
only on clean examples. We put y values of the last epoch explicitly on the figures. (a) Success rate of our
attack. (b) Average word replacement rate of adversarial examples. (c) Model performance on original
examples.
We see from Table 5 that although the workers were expected to give a score of 5 for identical examples,
they gave a score of 4.13 and 4.96 for the IMDB and AG’s News dataset, respectively. The score for the
IMDB dataset (4.13) is lower than that of the AG’s News dataset (4.96). We believe that examples of the
IMDB dataset longer than the examples of the AG’s News dataset makes it harder for workers to judge
whether or not two examples are identical.
4.4 Adversarial Training
We conduct further experiments to validate if robustness against our attack can be achieved by adversarial
training. To save time, we do adversarial training by fine-tuning on pretrained models. During adversarial
training, the training set is augmented by adversarial examples, which successfully fool the model and are
generated in each epoch by perturbing the correctly classified examples.
Figure 2 (a) shows that adversarial training helps, as the success rates of the attack gradually drops.
Figure 2 (b) demonstrates that the average replacement rates increase as we do adversarial training. Lower
success rates and higher word replacement rates show that the models are gaining robustness against our
attack by adversarial training. We also notice from Figure 2 (b) that the average word replacement rates of
adversarial examples start to decrease after training for some epochs. We believe that the model becomes
more robust by first identifying adversarial examples with higher word replacement rates. Hence, the
adversarial examples left after some epochs of adversarial training have relatively lower word replacement
rates.
Figure 2 (c) shows the model accuracy on clean examples. For the IMDB dataset, adversarial training
gradually lowers the model accuracy on clean examples. This is in line with previous image domain
research, showing that model robustness is at odds with accuracy (Tsipras et al., 2019). However, we do
not observe this phenomenon for the AG’s News dataset. This indicates that although adversarial training
for texts and images are similar, they are still different in certain aspects.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose a geometry-inspired attack for generating natural language adversarial
examples. Our attack generates adversarial examples by iteratively approximating the decision boundary
of Deep Neural Networks. Experiments on two text classification tasks with two models show that our
attack reaches high success rates while keeping low word replacement rates. Human evaluation shows
that adversarial examples generated by our attack are hard to recognize for humans. Experiments also
show that adversarial training increases model robustness against our attack. Our current attack works for
models with context-independent word embeddings. In the future, we would like to extend our attack to
models using contextualized word embeddings, including ELMo (Peters et al., 2018), BERT (Devlin et
al., 2019), etc.
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